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Economic development and industrial relations: the case of 
South and Southeast Asia 
 
Sarosh Kuruvilla 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University 
C. S. Venkataratnarn 
International Management Institute, New Delhi 
This article outlines the close relationship between economic development and industrial relations in 
South and Southeast Asia. After an examination of key industrial relations features, the authors 
discuss emergent global trends and current Asian realities, and highlight lessons from the Asian 
experience, and the implications for the future. 
 
The South and Southeast Asian region is distinctive in economic terms for several reasons. Despite 
accounting for roughly one half of the world’s population (2.863 million), parts of this region have been 
the fastest growing areas in the world in the 1980s, while other parts have lagged severely behind. 
Between 1965 and 1990, the average rate of economic growth between 1965 and 1990 has exceeded 
5% per annum in Southeast Asia, but only 1.8% in South Asia, compared to 2.2% for the OECD countries. 
1.7% in Latin America, and 0.2% in sub Saharan Africa. Southeast Asia has enjoyed high export growth; 
in some countries exports exceeded 12% per annum, whereas world exports grew at only 5.5% during 
1970-1992. The average savings rates in several Southeast and South Asian countries are high, and in 
some cases as high as 30% of GDP. In recent years, the South and Southeast Asian region has accounted 
for fully 50% of the inflows of foreign direct investment to developing countries.  
 A recent World Bank report trying to explain the dramatic growth of Southeast Asia is largely 
inconclusive since it finds support for two competing explanations [1]. More specifically, the neoclassical 
explanation highlights the importance of several factors, including low inflation, a stable legal and 
political framework, open economic systems, and undistorted prices. The revisionist explanation 
highlights deliberate state intervention via protection and price distortions. However, there is consensus 
in the World Bank report, as well as in the writings of various experts that industrial relations and 
human resource policies of governments have been critical to the success of these economies [2]. 
  
 Although the preceding paragraph suggests a certain uniformity in Asian development, it is 
important to note that the Asian region is also very diverse economically. Whatever criteria are chosen, 
the region offers examples at both extremes, be it area, population, gross national product, political 
ideology, unemployment levels, poverty, literacy and so on. Table 1 provides some sense of the diversity 
in Asian economies.  
 Industrial relations systems in the region also exhibit diversity. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the inter-relationship between economic development and industrial relations in Asia, and in 
particular, to highlight the trends in industrial relations over the last decade. Then, the implication of the 
current international context for the future of industrial relations will be examined in more detail. 
Economic development 
The rapid economic development of the Southeast Asian region has occurred in different time periods. 
In contrast to Japan (whose economic development received a spurt after post war reconstruction, 
although the Japanese economy had a diversified industrial base from which takeoff occurred), the 
Asian Tigers [NICs] (Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) commenced rapid growth during the 
decade of the 1960s and early 1970s. The ’emerging’ tigers of Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Indonesia grew the fastest in the 1980s, while it appears to be the turn of selected Asian countries 
notably China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and India to be the fastest growing economies in the 1990s. In 
order to set the stage for our discussion regarding industrial relations and labour policy, at least two 
aspects of Asian economic development merit attention.  
 The first significant aspect of Asian development has been the strong role played by the state in 
the economic sphere. Contrary to Western European and US economic development which have been 
led by private enterprise, South and Southeast Asian development has been managed by the state. 
However, there has been variation in the role played by the state in different countries. For instance, in 
the Japanese and Korean examples, the state influenced the nature of investment, the industries which 
were chosen for investment, influenced the number of firms that could enter the economic sector, and 
often, as in the case of Korea, actively financed private sector investment. In the case of Southeast Asia, 
the state’s role has been more facilitative, creating the conditions necessary for the attraction of foreign 
investment for economic development. In the case of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, the 
state has reserved for itself the responsibility of economic development through large public sector 
industries. As will be argued later, the differing role of the state has implications for labour and 
industrial relations as well.  
 The second significant feature of economic development in the region has been the existence of 
a clearly conceptualised industrialization strategy. In East and Southeast Asia, the successful economies 
have followed an outward looking export oriented industrialization strategy. In contrast, in China and 
South Asia, the industrialisation strategy has been inward looking and focusing on import substitution. 
Kuruvilla suggests the existence of two primary industrialization strategies-the import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) strategy and the export oriented industrialisation strategy (EO1) - although within 
each strategy there is variability [3].  
 In the case of ISI, there is first stage or ’simple’ IS1 based on the development of low technology 
consumer and industrial goods for local consumption. The focus of the industrialisation strategy is to 
promote the growth of locally owned industries catering to the relatively large domestic market in order 
to conserve foreign exchange and to promote industrialisation and local entrepreneurship. The second 
stage of IS1 is characterised by the development of heavy industries such as railways, atomic energy, 
steel, heavy chemicals, defence and space industries, where the focus of the strategy has been to create 
a diversified industrial base that will fuel future growth. For example, the IS1 adopted by Singapore, 
Malaysia, Philippines, S. Korea, and Taiwan during the early stages of their development can be 
classified as ’simple’ while ‘advanced’ IS1 was characteristic of India’s and China’s industrialisation 
strategy until the 1990s. 
 Similarly, the EOI strategy exhibits variation. Typically, first stage EOI in Southeast Asia has been 
characterised by its focus on low cost production of light manufacturing goods for exports, largely 
financed by foreign investment. Multinational companies in the electronics, electrical, textile, and 
footwear industries dominated investment in this strategy. The aims of this strategy have been to create 
employment and the earning of foreign exchange to repay debts to the international financing system in 
the case of both Malaysia and the Philippines, and in the case of Singapore, and Taiwan, this strategy 
was the only answer to growth given that their relatively smaller markets and lack of local capital could 
not sustain an IS1 strategy [4]. Second stage EOI is characterized by its concentration on technological 
upgradation of the first stage EOI industries, a move to higher value added products, and innovations in 
manufacturing process [5]. Second stage EOI in Singapore and Malaysia has been accompanied by 
efforts to diversify the industrial base of the economy, and is seen in the investment in large industrial 
projects in iron and steel, chemicals, and automobiles in several Asian countries such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, Korea, and Taiwan. 
 What is also important is that the fast growing Asian countries are currently at different levels of 
industrialisation. For example, Singapore, Taiwan, and S. Korea are all at the second stage export 
oriented industrialisation with more high value added manufacturing and higher cost and skilled labour 
requirements. Singapore is at a critical juncture in its industrialization where it is shifting to a service 
dominated economy. Malaysia and Thailand are rapidly entering this second stage, while the Philippines 
and Indonesia are currently low cost first stage EOI countries. Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos are 
emerging out of their early IS1 phases and aggressively becoming export oriented economies. India and 
China, both of whom for years had followed a heavy and capital intensive inward looking IS1 strategy 
are now gradually shifting to export oriented economies. 
 
The relationship between industrialisation and industrial relations policies 
Industrialisation and IR policy 
The link between industrialisation strategies and industrial relations, national industrial relations policies 
as well as workplace industrial relations practices, is best illustrated by the argument found in a paper by 
Kuruvilla [6]. In this paper Kuruvilla examines four countries, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines and India, 
although the argument is true for several countries in the Asian region. The argument is delineated in 
Figure 1. 
  As Figure 1 indicates, there is a close association between industrialisation strategies and 
industrial relations policies in Southeast Asia. It appears that certain kinds of industrialisation strategies 
and certain kinds of national labour policies go hand in hand. 
 Under import substitution industrialisation, the focus of labour policy is largely pluralistic. Given 
that the strategy is inward looking and is therefore protected against external competition, most Asian 
governments have not attempted to significantly regulate industrial relations. In fact, labour policies of 
most of the South Asian countries (eg. India) and many of the Southeast Asian countries during their 
brief IS1 periods emphasised pluralism in industrial relations. In a discussion on India, it is noted that the 
"IS1 strategy and existing industrial relations policies are mutually sustaining. The protection afforded to 
Indian manufacturers from foreign competition, and a guaranteed internal market, has in the views of 
several observers created huge inefficiencies in several fields, including labour costs [7]. In other words, 
a protectionist IS1 strategy was congruent with a highly protectionist IR system that impinged negatively 
on the development of collaborative and flexible industrial relations". 
 Under first stage export oriented industrialisation, the primary focus of industrial relations 
policy at the national level was on cost containment. Except in the case of Korea and Japan where 
investment was from within, in all the other countries of Asia, export orientation has been based on the 
competitive advantage of low cost labour financed by foreign investment. It was the need to attract and 
retain foreign investment that drove economies to enact IR policies geared towards cost containment. 
For example, both Malaysia and the Philippines enacted rules that restricted the amount of overtime, 
refused to legislate equal pay for equal work in export oriented industries where most of the labour was 
female, and exempted foreign investors from much labour and employment legislation. 
 The first stage EOI strategy was also predicated on providing investors with cheap, flexible and 
highly compliant labour. Here again, the approach of most countries has been to suppress the growth of 
trade unionism. Deyo has made a strong case that Asian industrialism has been based on some amount 
of labour subordination [8]. Several countries have banned unionisation (for example, unionisation in 
the export oriented electronics industry in Malaysia was banned until 1988), or otherwise restricted the 
ability of workers to form unions. In other cases, authoritarian regimes have suppressed union activity. 
S. Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia have all at some time or another severely 
restricted the ability of workers to form unions. There is evidence that the goals of export oriented 
industrialization and a restrictive and exclusive labour policy are highly congruent [9]. 
 However, in more advanced export orientation based on higher technology the focus of labour 
policy changes away from cost containment and union repression to the development of highly skilled 
and flexible, yet productive labour. Again, in all countries that have embarked on this second stage of 
EOI, there have been efforts to reform the education system to provide better qualified workers to the 
growing export industry, as well as a tremendous effort to develop skills through various incentives 
started by the government. In Malaysia and Singapore for example, the government has introduced the 
concept of Skills Development Funds [10]. Employers must pay a certain percentage of payroll costs into 
the fund, and can reclaim a part of their contributions only if they invest in training. Both Korea and 
Taiwan have a history of skills development through various vocational training centers. In addition, 
almost all countries have decentralized bargaining structures to enable bargaining to reflect the unique 
conditions of individual industries and firms [11]. The point is that there is a qualitative shift in the focus 
of labour and industrial relations and human resources policy at the national level consequent to a 
change in the industrialization strategy. 
 The most interesting case, and one that further supports the industrialisation and industrial 
relations framework is the case of India. After 40 years of ISI, the shift of the Indian economy in 1992 to 
an export oriented one is bringing tremendous pressure on the industrial relations system to change 
[12]. Although the direction of change is unclear, clearly it is moving towards increased workplace 
flexibility. Therefore, it appears rather clear that Asian industrial relations policy is closely and intimately 
connected with the industrialisation strategies of their countries 
Industrialisation and IR/HR practices 
Apart from its effect on macro level IR/HR policy, the industrialisation strategy has also been shown to 
affect the nature of IR/HR practice in firms. In studying the effects of industrialisation on IR/HR practices 
in several firms in the IS1 and EOI sectors in Malaysia and the Philippines, KuruvilIa finds the following 
[13]. First, there are differences in IR/HR practices between the IS1 and EOI sectors in each country. In 
the IS1 sector, firms appear to be following more ’passive’ human resource practices. In the EOI sector, 
in both countries, the human resource practices appear to evidence more diversity, but suggest a 
general pattern of more ‘aggressive’ and flexible IR/HR practices, that appear to fit the pattern of ‘new 
human resource systems’ alluded to by many authors. Second, these differences between the 
industrialisation regimes are evidenced in both countries. Third, the IR/HR practices under a more 
advanced EOI strategy in Malaysia differ from the IR/HR practices in first stage EOI in the Philippines, 
which is best exemplified by the electronics industry, which constitutes the bulk of the EOI sector in 
both countries.  
 Note that industrialisation’s effects on IR/ HR practices work indirectly through the various 
mechanisms used by countries to attract a certain type of foreign investment, and in creating two 
distinct sectors within the economy. The IS1 sector, which is protected from external competition, has 
less need to adopt competitive human resource practices relative to the export oriented sector that 
must compete internationally. In addition, given that export oriented sectors are typically dominated by 
foreign investment, it is only natural that the diffusion of human resource innovations from investor 
countries will reach the exports sector quicker. The difference in workplace level human resource and 
industrial relations practices across the two sectors found in Kuruvilla’s paper has also been found in 
other studies in other Asian countries [14]. 
 
The institutional variation in South/Southeast Asian IR Systems 
 
Despite the close connection between industrialization and macro level IR policy as well as micro level 
IR practice, it is important to note that there is considerable variation in the specific institutions that 
countries have adopted to attain national level IR policy goals. In other words, although there appears to 
be a commonality in terms of macro level goals brought about by the industrialization strategy, there is 
considerable divergence in the rules, legislation, and institutions that have been adopted by various 
countries in attaining macro policy goals. 
 The variation in institutional arrangements are largely a product of political choices made by the 
state, as well as the previous institutional IR/HR history of the parties [15]. The goal in this section is to 
give the reader a sense of the differences in terms of approach to labour legislation and institutions in 
South and Southeast Asia. 
 
Labour protection 
Typically the first plank in Asian labour policy, is on labour protection, ie., labour standards, laws and 
welfare policies. There is a remarkable similarity in labour protection legislation in all Asian economies. 
All these economies are characterised by advanced legislation mandating annual leave, casual leave, 
maternity leave, child care (borne by employer), and legislation regarding overtime, working hours, 
safety and health, restrictions on terminations, severance pay, annual bonus, and retirement benefits. 
Protective labour legislation is advanced, certainly more so than the US, and the commonalities are 
explained more by the willingness of these economies to follow established ILO conventions with 
respect to these issues. 
 However, despite similar legislation, there is wide variation in enforcement of these laws. So far, 
Singapore is perhaps the only country where all labour standards laws are enforced in full. Several 
countries have revised labour standards laws downward (eg. Philippines), arguing that they are too 
advanced for developing economies. There is some truth in this argument, given that the models of 
legislation in Scandinavia have been the basis for many of these laws. In other cases (eg. Taiwan), 
enactment of the labour standards legislation has been the basis for increased union activity and the 
cause of increased labour management conflicts [16]. In general terms however, the labour standards 
laws 'on the books' in Asian countries are relatively advanced [17]. 
 
Labour relations 
It is in the area of labour relations where one sees vastly different institutional regulation in Asia. Here 
we discuss several issues such as bargaining structure, union structure, the subjects of bargaining, and 
the right to strike. 
 
 
Bargaining and union structure 
Fundamentally, there have been two approaches in Asia. The first approach, characterised by Singapore 
had a highly centralised bargaining system with wage increases suggested by the tripartite national 
wages council that were adopted economy wide. In Korea and Taiwan, centralization has been the norm 
during the authoritarian periods. However, in most other Asian countries, bargaining has been 
decentralised to the industry and firm level. 
 In terms of the bargaining structure at the workplace there is variation. Most countries allow 
only one union per workplace. However India, and recently Korea have adopted multiple union systems. 
In the latter countries, the absence of a sole bargaining agent has led to a large number of industrial 
disputes and escalating inter-union conflict and rivalry, inhibiting the ability of nations to develop stable 
and cooperative industrial relations [18].  
 During the last decade, there has been a changing trend in the bargaining structure in Asia 
towards increased decentralisation. For example, Singapore has completely abandoned its centralised 
wage determination principle, in favour of more flexible wages that reflect the differential competitive 
position of each industry and firm. To further facilitate decentralisation, in the early 1980s' Singapore 
also mandated the formation of 'house' or enterprise unions, based on the argument that a change in 
union structure would enhance workplace flexibility. The trend towards increased decentralisation in 
union structure has also occurred in Malaysia, which also has enterprise union legislation, as does 
Taiwan. In other countries such as Thailand, India, Philippines, bargaining and union structures are 
highly decentralised for the most part, and in Korea, the situation is in flux as labour policy has not yet 
been determined. 
 
Union federations 
There are a few countries where there is only one trade union federation such as Singapore, China and 
Indonesia. These federations are normally closely linked and identified with the political party in power. 
However, only one country allows union involvement in national level decisions. Singapore, for example, 
created a tri-partite framework in which the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), and the Employers 
Federation (SNEF) were provided with representation on all important national bodies, including the 
National Wages Council, the Economic Development Board, the Housing Board, and in boards and 
enterprises in every sphere of govemment [19]. This form of European style social partnership has not 
been found anywhere else. This tripartism has been achieved also because of the creation of an 
enterprise union structure in which all enterprise unions are affiliated to one major federation, the 
NTUC.  
 The more common model in this region is the existence of multiple trade union federations. 
Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, India, Thailand all follow the multiple federation model, although none of 
these federations have any significant influence through institutionalised means on national policy. 
More recently, Korea only recognised one single union federation, although other federations (illegal) 
continue to exist. The variation in the number of federations is large. Whilst most countries have two or 
three major federations (mostly one for the private sector and one for the public sector), India too has 
10 major federations, Pakistan has 7 major federations, and Thailand has 8 federations. The Philippines, 
which has a highly fragmented labour movement reports over 155 federations [20]. There is also the 
model where the state actively encourages the formation of rival federations to counter the opposition 
to the ruling regime, such as in the case of the Malay Labour Organisation [21].  
 Apart from the formal tripartism that exists in Singapore, tri-partism in other countries is either 
nonexistent or weak. It has been suggested that most Asian countries have attempted to institutionalise 
tripartism through formal bodies or meetings, with varied success. Many of these efforts are in the form 
of codes of conduct that are voluntarily agreed to by significant employer and union federations. For 
example, India has the Code of Conduct on Industrial Discipline which outlines the principles to be used 
in dismissal and in union recognition. In Indonesia, there exists a 1982 joint statement on labour 
relations to maintain industrial peace. Malaysia has a code of conduct for 'Industrial Harmony and Areas 
for Cooperation'. The Philippines has a joint communique of the 'National Tripartite Conference on 
Wages, Employment, and Industrial Relations', while Thailand has the 'Code of Practice for the 
Promotion of Labor Relations'.  
 However, these codes have had restricted success, largely due to the unwillingness of trade 
unions or employer organisations to follow the code completely, as well as with problems connected 
with inter-union or inter-federation rivalry, problems concerning union recognition and problems with 
the concept of consultation as compared with that of negotiation, ie. the difficulty in drawing clear 
distinctions between tripartite consultation and bipartite negotiations. As Venkataratnam suggests, 
these Codes have to be seen in the "political contexts in which they are agreed upon and the quality of 
the environment and the nature of implementation, both of which leave much to be desired" [22]. Our 
general finding here is that with the exception of Singapore, the single or multiple federation model 
does not seem to have yielded any significant influence for trade unions in national decision making. 
 
The subjects of bargaining 
There is variation in terms of the subjects of bargaining. At one extreme is the model in India where 
unions and employers are allowed to bargain over any issue. At the other extreme are countries that 
restrict the subjects of bargaining to a considerable extent. For example, Singapore and Malaysia do not 
allow bargaining regarding transfers, promotions, work assignments, redundancies, layoffs and 
retrenchment. In its EOI phase, Korea did not permit bargaining over wages, although this has changed 
consequent to 1987. Taiwan's labour law does not permit bargaining over issues connected with the 
introduction of new technology. Another restriction often found in several countries is the need for 
collective bargaining agreements to be certified by the Industrial Court (Singapore and Malaysia), and 
the Industrial Court is empowered to refuse certification if collective bargaining agreements contain 
provisions that are detrimental to the national interest. The ability of unions to bargain freely therefore 
appears to be restricted in some countries. 
 
The right to strike 
One distinctive feature of Asian economies is that there are several administrative restrictions on the 
right to strike. The primary motivation to restrict the right to strike has been the argument that 
industrial conflict should not hamper economic development. The most common administrative 
restriction, found in all Asian countries is the prohibition of the right to strike in essential industries. 
There is considerable variation in what constitutes ‘essential’ with some countries like Singapore having 
more industries under this classification than other countries. In addition, the right to strike in the public 
sector is also restricted. 
 In addition, the right to strike is circumscribed in other ways. For example, in India, Singapore, 
and Malaysia, a strike or lockout must be called off once an industrial dispute is under third party 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Some countries such as Singapore and the Philippines mandate 
taking a strike vote by secret ballot, while other countries such as Korea enforce a two week cooling off 
period before strikes can occur. Perusal of the ILO yearbook of labour statistics shows that the number 
of strikes have declined in every Asian country during the decade of the 1980s, with the exception of 
Korea and Taiwan, where the number of strikes rose sharply after democratisation in 1987 [23]. 
  
 
 
Stylised models in South and Southeast Asia 
 The above discussion suggests the existence of several different models in South and Southeast 
Asia. For the purposes of illustration these models are presented below. Note that most Asian countries 
in the region have adopted models that have features of these stylized models. Note also that within 
these models, there have been shifts as industrialisation strategies have shifted. 
 
The tripartite and flexible Singapore Model 
The essential features of this model include the equal partnership between trade unions, employers and 
government in all aspects of macro-economic and macro-social policy. Wage bargaining is thus de facto 
centralised given the tripartite representation on the National Wages Council. However, the level of 
trade union influence at the national level is not matched by equivalent influence at the workplace level. 
At the workplace, the accent of the model is on providing employers with considerable flexibility to 
react to changing economic conditions  
 The key outcomes of this model have been largely positive. While the social partnership at the 
national level has ensured that Singaporean workers have a steady improvement in living standards 
through its economic development policies, the model has shown that it is possible to use labour policy 
to make the transition from first stage EOI to second Stage EOI [24]. The changes and enhancements 
made to the model such as the change in union structure to enterprise unions in 1981 has enhanced 
flexibility further. However, workplace democracy and participation is not guaranteed by the model, 
unless it occurs due to the changing nature of the workforce and skills. In the mid 1980s, the National 
Wage Council has decentralized its wage recommendations, consistent with the needs of flexibility. 
 
State-employer dominated exclusionary and flexible model 
 
The main features of this model suggest a strong role for the state with employers having rather greater 
bargaining power than trade unions. In this model, trade unions have very little influence over national 
issues (trade union federations are registered as societies, not unions in Malaysia). In this model, there 
is relatively little centralisation. Workplace industrial relations are largely similar to the Singapore 
model, emphasizing flexibility. In the export oriented sectors, there is very low incidence of unionism. 
 In terms of outcomes, this model has performed very well in those countries that have 
successfully adopted EOI, in terms of ensuring that there have been increases in real wages and 
employment. However, these increases have often come at the expense of union representation, given 
that the current system permits employer tactics and strategies to effectively oppose union formation. 
Stability in industrial relations has been achieved by some degree of coercion, while flexibility has been 
promoted through institutional features. 
 
The pluralistic, decentralised and fragmented IR model 
 
This model is characteristic of the Philippines, which has a pluralistic IR system, in which it is easy for 
trade unions to form, but where they have little influence at the national level. Another feature is the 
extensive fragmentation of trade unions, with more than 155 federations. The lack of unity of the labour 
movement and the intense inter-union rivalry has resulted in very weak trade unions. 
 The model has had little success in increasing real wages, or workplace democracy. As Pagnucco 
suggests, employers are free to pursue anti-union strategies with remarkable success [25]. Government 
legislation, which has changed between the dictatorship and democracy periods is focused at limiting 
the ability of unions to strike freely in the interests of economic development. 
The politicised multi-union model 
This is most characteristic of India and other Southeast Asian countries. In this model, trade unions are 
highly politicised and their affiliation with political parties not only gives them some input on national 
issues through the party structure, but has also been responsible for getting very favourable protective 
legislation for organised workers [26]. In this model, union formation, recognition, and functioning is 
well protected by law, and bargaining is highly decentralised. 
 The model, while providing organised workers with considerable protection, has worked 
negatively against the development of efficiency and workplace flexibility. For example the principle of 
allowing multiple unions in each workplace has resulted in intense inter-union rivalry that impinges on 
the development of long term collaborative relationships between workers and management [27]. In 
addition, the inability of the employer to layoff, retrench workers or close industries without 
government permission (which has been useful to protect employment) has created inefficiencies [28]. 
Most significantly the politicisation of unions and the concept of outside political leaders functioning as 
enterprise union leaders results in bringing political considerations into the workplace [29]. Therefore, 
this model leans towards equity and protection at the expense of efficiency and flexibility. Note, 
however, that with economic liberalization in India since 1992, there is considerable pressure for reform 
in workplace industrial relations 
 
The newly democratic transitory model 
 
This model is characteristic of industrial relations in Korea and Taiwan. In both countries, the shift from 
authoritarian forms of government to democratic forms of government has completely destabilized 
established patterns of industrial relations. In both countries there has been an increase in strikes and 
union militancy after democratisation. Previously completely controlled by the state, industrial relations 
is now allowed to float freely. Employers, who have never had to deal with unions are now faced with 
the prospect of very little experience in negotiations. In this situation, new industrial relations policies 
are required. In both countries, the democratic state has been slow to articulate a new set of IR policies, 
and a period of experimentation and learning continues. Although this is a transitory phase in Asian 
industrial relations, it has relevance for other emerging economies in Asia, particularly Burma, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, all of which are also emerging from more authoritarian systems to more 
democratic ones.  
 The five stylised models capture most of the variation in approaches to industrial relations in 
Southeast Asia. Note that most countries adopt variations on one or two of these models. Most 
importantly, these models are also undergoing change with rapid economic development. The next 
section outlines the emerging trends in South and Southeast Asian economies over the last decade. 
 
Important industrial relations outcomes and trends 
 
Having provided a description of the variation in approaches to industrial relations, the goal in this 
section is to discuss significant trends in South and Southeast Asian industrial relations over the last 
decade 
 
Weak and declining unions 
There has not been a tradition of strong unions in Asia. In the most obvious indication of trade union 
strength, the density of unionisation, Asian trade unions fall way behind their Western counterparts. In 
1993, the country with the highest unionization rate was S. Korea, with a union density approaching 30% 
of the nonagricultural workforce. Apart from Taiwan and South Korea, which have reported increases in 
trade union density post their 1987 democratisation, almost all other countries in Asia have experienced 
a decline in trade union density. Japan's union density has declined from a high of 30% in 1985 to 22.7% 
in 1992, Singapore's union density has declined from 25.5% of the labour force in 1976 to 14.4% in 
1992[30]. Every other industrialised Asian nation has seen declines in union density over the last few 
decades. 
 The density of unionisation however is not always related to the power that trade unions have 
in the region. For example, India's trade union density (expressed as a percentage of the nonagricultural 
workforce) is only 2.6%. However, the political orientation of trade unions and their close ties with 
India's political parties has ensured that the labour movement has a political influence far greater than 
their number suggest. Labour is the swing vote in at least 30% of all parliamentary constituencies [31]. 
The Indian case suggests, therefore, that trade union influence and power are not determined by sheer 
numbers, but to the institutional network in which unions operate, and the specific exclusionary or 
inclusionary policies of the state. 
 The shifts in industrialization strategy from IS1 to EOI has negatively impacted the ability of 
unions to form, and to bargain collectively. In the Southeast Asian nations in particular, the restrictions 
on union formation in certain sectors and export processing zones, the restrictions on the subjects of 
bargaining, combined with a rapidly growing economy and in real wages have dampened the ability of 
unions to grow and the enthusiasm of people to join unions. Apart from Singapore where unions have 
considerable influence at the strategic level of the economy, union influence has declined with the 
declines in union density. In countries such as the Philippines, the intense fragmentation of the labour 
movement (155 Federations and 5600 independent unions) noted by Ofreneo have weakened unions 
[32]. Even in India where the ties between unions and political parties have been historically strong, the 
introduction of economic liberalisation has polarized relations given that the political party in power was 
pro liberalisation, while its trade union arm has been anti liberalisation. 
 The fastest growing sector in most Asian economies is the export oriented sector, consisting of 
firms in the textile, electronics, and garments industries. This is the largest growing economic sector in 
Southeast Asia. This is also a sector that is almost completely union free. A recent ILO report criticizing 
governments for banning unions in export sectors has resulted in protests by governments. 
 
When criticized for being authoritarian regarding unions, governments point out that real wages, even those for 
low skilled workers, have risen quite steadily in the post colonial period, and that this has been achieved with 
declining income inequality [33]. 
 With the increasing adoption of the export oriented model of development, one significant trend in 
Asian industrial relations is the rise of the non-union model during the last decade. 
 
 
Decentralisation in bargaining and workplace flexibility 
 
As noted earlier, a second significant trend is towards decentralisation in bargaining. This movement 
appears consistent with developments in the advanced European and North American nations noted by 
Katz [34]. The decentralisation in bargaining in several Asian countries appears to be part of a larger 
movement towards the need for increased workplace flexibility. In every Asian country there is a clear 
trend towards highly flexible wages, breakdown of industry wide bargaining structures, and the spread 
of enterprise unions. The increasing need for workplace flexibility can be traced to several factors, 
notably the shift into more high tech EOI, the adoption of increasingly complex micro-electronic 
technologies, particularly in the export sectors, and increased competition and globalisation on an 
international scale, all of which have put pressure on firms to adapt flexibly to changing market 
conditions. A good illustration of this trend is the sudden and growing movement amongst Indian 
employers for workplace flexibility once India shifted from its IS1 strategy to a more liberalised 
economy. The trend towards decentralisation and workplace flexibility appears to be highly correlated 
with the level of development as well as the level of integration internationally. 
 
Worker participation 
 
Although worker participation in decision-making had been institutionalised in several countries in the 
form of Joint Labour Management Committees (most countries have one such institution), these 
institutions have not been noteworthy for their success, as noted earlier. In the fast growing Southeast 
Asian nations, there is now a resurgence in worker participation, fueled by different reasons. This trend 
is noticeable particularly in the higher technology oriented export oriented electronics sectors. For 
example, Rajah suggests that higher end processes such as chip design, wirebonding and research and 
development operations are increasingly being located in Malaysia [35]. Work organisation in the 
electronics industry mirror practices followed in the advanced countries, while human resource 
management techniques are based increasingly on the development of skills with high pay and 
employee involvement in an increasingly non-union environment [36]. 
 
Increased emphasis on training, productivity and new payment forms 
 
The shift into higher technology intensive industries for export, the diffusion of new technologies that 
call for more skilled and participative workers has also brought with it changes in the methods of wage 
payment. For example in Malaysia, under the low cost EOI phase, compensation policies in the 
electronics industry were geared towards keeping costs low [37]. Wages were kept to minimum levels, 
and the government’s persistent refusal to enact equal pay for equal work legislation, allowed the 
industry to employ young women at wages less than 60% of average male wages [38]. Workers were 
paid by a variety of piece rates and production incentives above the daily base rate [39]. 
 In the higher tech EOI phase, pay systems are increasingly looking like pay systems in more 
advanced economies. New forms of work organisation have brought with them new methods of training 
and wage payment systems. Increasingly, wages are tied to learning new skills, and Rajah notes that in 
many semiconductor companies, a production worker needs to know at least three processes to 
become a super operator with salaries reaching almost 750 M$ a month (US$301) [40]. The average 
wage in the electronics industry is about 350 M$ (US$167) per month). 
 In addition to pay systems, there has been increased attention to training to upskill the 
workforce to sustain the higher tech EOI strategy. Both governments and firms have demonstrated an 
increase in training efforts. For example, in Penang (Malaysia), the electronics companies in Penang who 
are fierce competitors in the global market have begun collaborative efforts for skills development. They 
have formed the skills development centre, where each company contributes equipment and training 
professionals to train skilled workers for the entire industry [41]. These firm level efforts are, of course, 
buttressed by national level efforts to increase workforce skills, via the introduction of Skills 
Development Funds in Malaysia and Singapore, or by extensive restructuring of the education sector. 
 
Increased focus on job security 
 
One consequence of the rapid development of the Asian region has been the shortage of labour in 
several countries (although this is less true of South Asia, China, Philippines and Indonesia). The labour 
shortage has, in turn, brought about increased job security in the Southeast Asian economies. For 
example, in Singapore and Malaysia, the use of temporary or casual workers has declined considerably 
in the 1980s, while the use of subcontracting internationally has increased. In addition, Singapore, 
Malaysia, S. Korea, Taiwan, all have introduced guest worker programmes, using the surplus skilled and 
unskilled labour from Philippines, India, and Indonesia and Pakistan. 
 
Decline in industrial conflict 
 
One very clear trend has been the decline in the number of strikes in South and Southeast Asia. At the 
low end, Singapore has reported zero strikes in the last five years. At the highest end, the number of 
strikes in India have also declined substantially over time. Table 2 provides some indication of the 
decline in conflict. In interpreting these figures, one must be careful, since a decline in strikes does not 
mean that labour-management cooperation is increasing. For example, in Malaysia and the Philippines, 
the decline in strikes has been accompanied by an increase in industrial disputes. In other cases, the 
decline in strikes is highly correlated with the decline in unions. And in Korea and Taiwan, the increase in 
strikes is a direct outcome of democratisation. But even in those countries, there have been declines 
since then. 
 
The integration of industrial relations policies with other macro policies 
 
The single most important trend in successful Southeast Asian economies is the increased integration 
across macro level policies in the interests of economic development. For example industrialisation 
policies are linked to industrial relations. The experience of Singapore and Malaysia have demonstrated 
that for successful upskilling and moving to higher technology EOI requires integration of IR policies with 
education policies (to provide skilled workers), human resource policies (for increased training), 
immigration policies and active labour market policies (to meet labour shortages) and financial and tax 
policies to continue to attract the right kind of foreign investment. This is perhaps the single most 
important lesson to be learnt from the fast developing Asian economies. 
 We want to emphasise, however, that these trends are more apparent in the Southeast Asian 
countries. South Asia however demonstrates a much more traditional picture of industrial relations, 
although conditions are undergoing rapid change in India. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri-Lanka's 
industrial relations systems remain largely static. 
 
The challenge of the future 
 
The twenty-first century presents a vastly different economic and social environment for South and 
Southeast Asia, with attendant implications for industrial relations policy and practice. We briefly 
describe the major developments, then examine the lessons from past experience and suggest a 
principle that could guide the development of industrial relations for the 21st century. 
 There are both global and regional economic imperatives to consider. The deepening of 
globalisation is paradoxically co-existent with a resurgence of regionalism. At the global level is the 
increased integration of product markets, capital markets, and even in labour markets. The position of 
Asian countries in the international division of labour is rendered increasingly precarious with these 
changes, as capital ranges more freely. In addition, the efforts to link industrial relations issues such as 
labour rights to trade liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation following GATT, will force 
countries to re-examine labour policy. All these factors exert a push to be more competitive. Clearly 
then, industrial relations systems must also change to ensure economic competitiveness and equity, as 
well as providing stability and flexibility to adapt quickly to changing international market conditions. 
 At the same time, internal factors peculiar to each economy is bringing about pressure for 
industrial relations change as well. In the successful countries of Southeast Asia, the trends are towards 
an increased shortage of labour, an increasingly well educated and wealthy workforce who are 
demanding more voice in industrial and economic decision making, and who are showing signs of 
increased dissatisfaction with existing authoritarian regimes. In addition, in the emerging countries, such 
as Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, democratisation and economic liberalisation exert pressure to enact new 
industrial relations policies for economic growth. The current experience of Indonesia is particularly 
instructive in this regard, given its rapid economic development and its poor record on labour rights. In 
the South Asian countries, where organised workers have enjoyed a very protective set of labour 
regulations, the increased pressure to open up their markets and drop protectionist barriers has 
resulted in pressures for more efficient industrial relations practices.  
 Furthermore, the movement towards the creation of regional economic blocs such as AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area), or APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Zone) also imply the necessity of 
harmonisation of IR policies for the success of these efforts. Already informal arrangements such as the 
plethora of regional growth triangles that are being formed requires the setting of new and common 
standards of industrial relations across several countries [42]. Clearly, the next century presents several 
opportunities for industrial relations reform in this region of Asia. 
 What have we learnt from the Southeast and South Asian experience so far? We have learnt 
that in the successful countries of Southeast Asia, industrial relations policies and institutions are closely 
tied to economic development strategies, and as economic development strategies change, so do IR 
policies and practices. We have learnt that the focus on efficiency with the erosion of labour rights is 
largely a transitory phase in the case of successful economies. While economic success alone has not 
resulted in an increase in labour rights, democratization forces within successful economies have 
resulted in an increase in labour rights. We have also learnt that the long run suppression of labour 
movements results in destabilisation in industrial relations. We have also witnessed the rise of 
progressive human resource practices in a non-union environment, particularly in competitive export 
sectors of several economies. In addition, new micro-electronic technologies that are increasingly 
adopted bring with them new forms of worker participation in firm level decisionmaking, new wage and 
benefit policies and increased job security. Finally, we have learnt that industrial relations must be 
congruent with several other macro policies such as education, training, and immigration to facilitate 
economic success. 
 Most significantly, the increasingly widespread adoption of the Asian model of development 
(from first stage EOI to service oriented economies) and the differential position of several Asian 
countries in this ladder of Asian development has provided newly developing Asian countries with a 
model of development and industrial relations. For instance, the emerging economies of Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam are adopting the development strategies of Singapore and Malaysia. 
 The Asian experience has shown us trends of both convergence and divergence in 
South/Southeastern industrial relations. The convergence appears to be in the congruence between 
industrial relations policies and industrialisation for economic development. The divergence is seen in 
the diverse industrial relations institutions and regulations adopted by different countries that are 
consistent with their unique political and cultural circumstances.  
 The wide variation in the countries in Asia prevent us from making a uniform prediction or 
prescription regarding the future of industrial relations. Nor is it possible to identify the features of an 
industrial relations system that is optimal. Industrial relations choices must be locally determined, and 
must be rooted in national, cultural, and institutional contexts. The Asian experience has shown us that 
even when there is similarity in thinking at the conceptual level, there is a significant divergence in the 
practical level based on the contexts in which the concepts are implemented. At this point, all we can 
offer are the past lessons of successful countries (described earlier) and the following key goal for 
industrial relations systems to adopt. 
 We posit that for industrial relations systems to help in both economic development and 
democracy, the challenge is how to achieve a stable and flexible industrial relations system that meets 
the twin goals of both 'efficiency' and 'equity'. The pure efficiency model can be faulted over its long 
term suppression of labour rights that results in conflict and destabilisation of industrial relations, such 
as the case in Korea and Taiwan, as well as to weak unions unable to participate in workplace decision 
making. Pure equity models can be faulted for their excessive labour regulations that inhibit the ability 
of work-places to react flexibly to a changing environment. 
 In adopting the principles of stability and flexibility in industrial relations such that both 
efficiency and equity goals are met, in the context of an increasingly global economy, several 
fundamental changes in the roles of industrial relations actors appear necessary. In particular, the 
decentralization of industrial relations implies that the states must devolve more power and control 
over industrial relations issues to employers and labour to develop solutions that reflect their unique 
interests and concerns. Structural and legislative changes may be necessary to ensure that labour and 
management have the ability to mutually solve their disagreements. Both externally and internally 
induced economic and social changes imply that the proposition that the state acts in the public interest 
or its interpretation of the public interest needs to be and will be questioned [43]. Clearly, with the 
increased decentralisation in industrial relations, the traditionally strong role of the state in Asia will 
come into question. Stephen Frenkel, in a new book on Asian Trade Unions, makes several critical 
arguments regarding the future scenario, that are worth note here [44].  
 To meet the goals of efficiency and equity in industrial relations, not only the roles of parties, 
but also their underlying values will come under increased scrutiny. There must be a redefinition of the 
commitment of the actors to principles of pluralism, freedom of association, and worker’s rights. Clearly 
economic forces will push for increased flexibility and efficiency. However, equity and stability can be 
addressed only by the parties themselves. In particular, in the Southeast Asian context, the role and 
legitimacy of trade unions or other representative bodies for workers needs to be understood and 
enhanced. 
 In addition, if actors at the national level cannot develop institutions and solutions to meet the 
requirements of efficiency and equity, there will be pressure from actors at the local level or the 
regional level for such efforts, given the drift towards globalisation and regionalisation as well as 
decentralization of IR. It is clear that the locus of industrial relations policy must shift from the national 
to the level of the workplace in order to meet the goals of IR systems articulated above. 
 To meet the goals of both efficiency and equity, it is also important for countries to rethink the 
purpose of industrial relations rules and regulations. Kuruvilla and Erickson suggest, in the 1940s, the 
purpose underlying the introduction of industrial relations legislation in most countries of the world has 
been to minimise industrial conflict [45]. They argue that in the 1990s, there seems to have been a 
change in the underlying purpose from minimising conflict to how best to promote productivity, 
flexibility, and in some cases, increased workplace democracy. The IR system of the 21st century must 
come to grips with these issues. 
 Finally, for industrial relations to effectively further democracy in any nation, there must be a 
change in the definition of workers and the coverage of existing labour legislation. In most Asian 
countries, only industrial workers appear to have coverage, leaving agricultural workers, rural farm 
workers, contingent workers, casual and contract labour, workers and employees in shops and 
establishments and small business outside the reaches of industrial relations regulation.  
 Therefore, our suggested goal of stability and flexibility and equity and efficiency implies many 
changes in the established ways of conceptualising industrial relations. It is our view that individual 
countries must devise their own systems and institutions that are congruent with their institutional 
history, national culture, and other macro policies in ways that meet the goals of stability, flexibility, 
efficiency and equity in industrial relations. Widespread acceptance of these goals is the only concrete 
principle that we have for the IR actors of the 21st century. 
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